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Many advances in physics have in common that some idea which was previously accepted as
fundamental, general, and inescapable was subsequently seen to be consequent, special, and dis-
pensable. The idea was not truly a general feature of the world, but only perceived to be general
because of our special place in the universe and the limited range of our experience. It was excess
baggage which had to be jettisoned to reach a more a more general perspective. This article discusses
excess baggage from the perspective of quantum cosmology which aims at a theory of the universe’s
quantum initial state. We seek to answer the question ‘Which features of our current theoretical
framework are fundamental and which reflect our special position in the universe or its special initial
condition?’ Past instances of cosmological excess baggage are reviewed such as the idea that the
Earth was at the center of the universe or that the second law of thermodynamics was fundamental.
Examples of excess baggage in our current understanding are the notion that measurement is central
to formulating quantum mechanics, a fundamental quantum mechanical arrow of time, and the idea
that a preferred time is needed to formulate quantum theory. We speculate on candidates for future
excess baggage.
I. QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
It is an honor, of course, but also a pleasure for me
to join in this celebration of Murray Gell-Mann’s sixti-
eth birthday and to address such a distinguished audi-
ence. Murray was my teacher and more recently we have
worked together in the search for a quantum framework
within which to erect a fundamental description of the
universe which would encompass all scales – from the
microscopic scales of the elementary particle interactions
to the most distant reaches of the realm of the galaxies
– from the moment of the big bang to the most distant
future that one can contemplate. Such a framework is
needed if we accept, as we have every reason to, that at
a basic level the laws of physics are quantum mechani-
cal. Further, as I shall argue below, there are important
features of our observations which require such a frame-
work for their explanation. This application of quantum
physics to the universe as a whole has come to be called
the subject of quantum cosmology.
The assignment of the organizers was to speak on the
topic “Where are our efforts leading?” I took this as an
invitation to speculate, for I think that it is characteristic
of the frontier areas of science that, while we may know
what direction we are headed, we seldom know where we
will wind up. Nevertheless, I shall not shrink from this
task and endeavor, in the brief time available, to make a
few remarks on the future of quantum cosmology. The
point of view that I shall describe owes a great deal to
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my conversations with Murray.
One cannot contemplate the history of physics without
becoming aware that many of its intellectual advances
have in common that some idea which was previously
accepted as fundamental, general, and inescapable was
subsequently seen to be consequent, special, and dispens-
able. Further, this was often for the following reason:
The idea was not truly a general feature of the world,
but only perceived to be general because of our special
place in the universe and the limited range of our ex-
perience. In fact, it arose from a true physical fact but
one which is a special situation in a yet more general the-
ory. To quote Murray himself from a talk of several years
ago: “In my field an important new idea ..... almost al-
ways includes a negative statement, that some previously
accepted principle is unnecessary and can be dispensed
with. Some earlier correct idea .... was accompanied by
unnecessary intellectual baggage and it is now necessary
to jettison that baggage.”[1]
In cosmology it is not difficult to cite previous examples
of such transitions [2]. The transition from Ptolemaic to
Copernican astronomy is certainly one. The centrality of
the earth was a basic assumption of Ptolemaic cosmol-
ogy. After Copernicus, the earth was seen not to be fun-
damentally central but rather one planet among others
in the solar system. The earth was in fact distinguished,
not by a law of nature, but rather by our own position as
observers of the heavens. The idea of the central earth
was excess baggage.
The laws of geometry of physical space in accessi-
ble regions obey the Euclidean laws typified by the
Pythagorean theorem on right triangles. Laws of physics
prior to 1915, for example those governing the propaga-
tion of light, incorporated Euclidean geometry as a fun-
damental assumption. After Einstein’s 1915 general the-
ory of relativity, we see Euclidean geometry not as funda-
mental, but rather as one possibility among many others.
In Einstein’s theory, the geometry in the neighborhood
2of any body with mass is non-Euclidean and this cur-
vature gives a profound geometrical explanation for the
phenomena we call gravity. On the very largest scales
of cosmology, geometry is significantly curved and it is
the dynamics of this geometry which describes the evolu-
tion of the universe. Euclidean geometry is the norm for
us, not because it is fundamental, but only because our
observations are mostly local and because we happen to
be living far from objects like black holes or epochs like
the big bang. The idea of a fixed geometry was excess
baggage.
In each of these examples there was a feature of the
current theoretical framework which was perceived as
fundamental but which in truth was a consequence of
our particular position and our particular time in the
universe in a more general theoretical framework. Our
description was too special. There was excess baggage
which had to be discarded to reach a more general and
successful viewpoint. Thus, in our effort to predict the fu-
ture of quantum cosmology, the question naturally arises:
Which features of our current theoretical framework re-
flect our special position in the universe1 and which are
fundamental? Which are excess baggage?
We live at a special position in the universe, not so
much in place, as in time. We are late, living some ten
billion years after the big bang, a time when many inter-
esting possibilities for physics could be realized which are
not easily accessible now. Moreover, we live in a special
universe. Ours is a universe which is fairly smooth and
simple on the largest scales, and the evidence of the ob-
servations is that if we look earlier in time it is smoother
and simpler yet. There are simple initial conditions which
are only one very special possibility out of many we could
imagine.
The question I posed above can therefore be general-
ized: Which features of our current theoretical framework
are fundamental and which reflect our special position in
the universe or our special initial conditions.2 Are there
natural candidates for elements of the framework which
might be generalized? Is there excess baggage? This is
the question that I would like to address today for quan-
tum cosmology.
II. QUANTUM MECHANICS
First, let us review the current quantum mechanical
framework today as it was developed in the twenties,
thirties and forties, and as it appears in most textbooks
today.
It is familiar enough that there is no certainty in this
1 In a currently (2005) popular terminology the regularities asso-
ciated with these features would be called emergent.
2 The current (2005) usage is initial condition (singular) since
there is only one wave function of the universe.
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FIG. 1: In quantum mechanics the probability for a particle
to be observed at position x at time t is the absolute square
of the amplitude to arrive there. In Feynman’s sum over
histories formulation, that amplitude is the sum over all paths
which are consistent with the initial conditions and arrive at
x at t of the amplitude for each path exp[iS(path)/h¯]. In the
Hamiltonian formulation of quantum mechanics, this sum is
called the wave function.
world and that therefore we must deal in probabilities.
When probabilities are sufficiently good we act. It wasn’t
certain that my plane to Los Angeles wouldn’t be blown
up, but I came because I thought that the probability
was sufficiently low. Experimentalists can’t be certain
that the results of their measurements are not in error,
but they publish because they estimate the probability
of this as low. And so on. It was the vision of classical
physics that fundamentally the world was certain and
that the use of probability was due to lack of precision.
If one looked carefully enough to start, one could with
certainty predict the future. Since the discovery of quan-
tum mechanics some sixty years ago, we have known that
this vision is only an approximation and that probabili-
ties are inevitable and fundamental.
Indeed, the transition from classical to quantum
physics contains a good example of excess baggage. In
this case it was classical determinism. Classical evolution
was but one possibility out of many although by far the
most probable evolution in the great majority of situa-
tions we were used to.
Quantum mechanics constructs probabilities according
to characteristic rules. As a simple example let us con-
sider the the quantum mechanics of a slowly moving par-
ticle such as an electron in a solid. Its path in spacetime
is called its history.
In classical mechanics the time history of the electron is
a definite path determined by the electron’s initial condi-
tions and its equation of motion. Thus, given sufficiently
3precise initial conditions, a later observation of position
can yield only a single, certain, predictable result. In
quantum mechanics, given the most precise possible ini-
tial conditions, all paths are possible and all possible
results of the observation may occur. There is only a
probability for any one of them. The probability of an
observation of position at time t yielding the value x, for
example, is constructed as follows:
A complex number, called the amplitude, is assigned
to each path. This number has the form exp[iS(path)/h¯]
where the action S the inertial properties of the electron
together with its interactions and h¯ is Planck’s constant.
The amplitude to arrive at x at t is the sum of the path
amplitudes over all paths which are consistent with the
initial conditions and which end at x at t (Figure 1).


amplitude to
arrive at position x
at time t

 =
∑
paths
exp[iS(path)/h¯] .
(2.1)
The sum here is over all paths consistent with the initial
conditions and ending at position x at time t. For exam-
ple, if the position of the particle were actually measured
at a previous time but not in between, one would sum
over all paths which connect that position with x. The
probability to arrive at x at t is the absolute square of
this amplitude. In essence, this is Feynman’s sum over
histories formulation of the rules of quantum mechanics.
There is another, older, way of stating these rules
called the Hamiltonian formulation of quantum mechan-
ics. Here, the amplitude for observing the electron at x
at time t is called the wave function ψ(x, t). If, as above,
we can construct the amplitude ψ(x, t) at one time, we
can also employ this construction at all other times. The
time history of the wave function gives a kind of run-
ning summary of the probability to find the electron at
x. The wave function is thus the closest analog to the
classical notion of “state of a system at a moment of
time”. The wave function obeys a differential equation
called the Schro¨dinger equation
ih¯
∂ψ
∂t
= Hψ (2.2)
where H is an operator, called the Hamiltonian, whose
form can be derived from the action. It summarizes the
dynamics in an equivalent way. Thus, although the elec-
tron’s position does not evolve according to a determin-
istic rule, its wave function does.
Feynman’s sum over histories formulation of quantum
mechanics is fully equivalent to the older Hamiltonian
formulation for this case of slowly moving particles. One
can calculate the wave function from (2.1) for two nearby
times and demonstrate that it satisfies the Schro¨dinger
equation (2.2). One can use either formulation of quan-
tum mechanics in this and many other situations as well.
More generally than the probability of one observa-
tion of position at one time, the probabilities of time
sequences of observations are of interest. Just such a se-
quence in needed, for example, to check whether or not
initial  conditions
t
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FIG. 2: Checks may be carried out as to whether the par-
ticle passed through position intervals A, B, · · · at times in
between the initial conditions and t. The amplitude to arrive
at position x at time t with a sequence of positive answers to
these checks is the sum over all paths which meet the initial
conditions and arrive at x and t having threaded the intervals
A, B, · · · The probability to arrive at x at t will depend on
whether these checks are carried out even if nothing is known
of the results
.
the electron is moving along a classical path between the
initial conditions and time t. The amplitude for posi-
tive answers to checks of whether the electron is located
inside a sequence of position intervals is the sum of the
amplitude for a path over all paths which thread these in-
tervals (Figure 2). The joint probability for the sequence
of positive answers is the square of this amplitude.
This means that the probability of finding the particle
at x at t depends not only on the initial conditions, but
also on what measurements were carried out between the
initial conditions and t. Even if one doesn’t know the re-
sults of these measurements, the probabilities at t will
still depend on whether or not they were carried out.
Thus, there are in quantum mechanics different rules for
evolution depending on whether measurements occurred
or did not. In the Hamiltonian formulation this means
that the wave function evolves by the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion only in between measurements. At a measurement
it evolves by a different rule – the notorious “reduction
of the wave packet”.
In some circumstances it makes no difference to the
probabilities whether prior measurements were carried
out or not. For example, the classical limit of quantum
mechanics occurs when the initial conditions are such
that only a single path to x — the classical one — con-
tributes to the sum over histories. Then, as long as suffi-
ciently crude measurements are considered, it makes no
difference to the probability of x at t whether they are
made or not. The electron follows the classical evolution.
4In such cases the classical history is said to “decohere ”.
III. FROM BOHR, TO EVERETT, TO
POST-EVERETT
The framework of quantum mechanics described in the
previous section was the starting point for the “Copen-
hagen” interpretations of this subject. An idea charac-
teristic of the Copenhagen interpretations was that there
was something external to the framework of wave func-
tion and Schro¨dinger equation which was necessary to
interpret the theory. Various expositors put this in dif-
ferent ways: Bohr [3] spoke of alternative descriptions in
terms of classical language. Landau and Lifshitz [4] em-
phasized preferred classical observables. Heisenberg and
others [5] stressed the importance of an external observer
for whom the wave function was the most complete sum-
mary possible of information about an observed system.
All singled out the measurement process for a special role
in the theory. In various ways, these authors were tak-
ing as fundamental the manifest existence of the classical
world that we see all about us. That is, they were tak-
ing as fundamental the existence of objects which have
histories whose probabilities obey the rules of classical
probability theory and, except for the occasional inter-
vention of the quantum world as in a measurement, obey
deterministic classical equations of motion. This exis-
tence of a classical world, however it was phrased, was
an important part of the Copenhagen interpretations for
it was the contact with the classical world which man-
dated the “reduction of the wave packet”.
The Copenhagen pictures do not permit the applica-
tion of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole.
In the Copenhagen interpretations the universe is always
divided into two parts: To one part quantum mechanical
rules apply. To the other part classical rules apply [6].
It was Everett who in 1957 first suggested how to gen-
eralize the Copenhagen framework so as to apply to cos-
mology [7]. His idea (independently worked out by Mur-
ray in 1963) was to take quantum mechanics seriously
and apply it to the universe as a whole. He started with
the idea that there is one wave function for the universe
always evolving by the Schro¨dinger equation and never
reduced. Any observer would be part of the system de-
scribed by quantum mechanics, not separate from it. Ev-
erett showed that, if the universe contains an observer,
then its activities — measuring, recording, calculating
probabilities, etc. — could be described in this gener-
alized framework. Further, he showed how the Copen-
hagen structure followed from this generalization when
the observer had a memory which behaved classically and
the system under observation behaved quantum mechan-
ically.
Yet, Everett’s analysis was not complete. It did not
explain the manifest existence of the classical world much
less the existence of something as sophisticated as an
observer with a classically behaving memory. Classical
behavior, after all, is not generally exhibited by quantum
systems. The subsequent, post-Everett, analysis of this
question involves a synthesis of the ideas of many people.
Out of many, I might mention in particular the work of
Joos and Zeh [8], Zurek [9], Griffiths [10], and latterly
Murray, Val Telegdi, and myself. It would take us too
far to attempt to review the mechanisms by which the
classical world arises but we can identify the theoretical
feature to which its origin can, for the most part, be
traced.
A classical world cannot be a general feature of the
quantum mechanics of the universe, for the number of
states which imply classical behavior in any sense is but
a poor fraction of the total states available to the uni-
verse. Classical behavior, of course, can be an approxi-
mate property of a particular state as for a particle in a
wave packet whose center moves according to the classical
equations of motion. But, the universe is in a particu-
lar state (or a particular statistical mixture of states).
More exactly, particular quantum initial conditions must
be posed to make any prediction in quantum cosmology.
It is to the particular features of the initial conditions
of the universe, therefore, that we trace the origin of
today’s classical world and the possibility of such infor-
mation gathering and utilizing systems as ourselves.
In retrospect, the Copenhagen idea that a classical
world or an observer together with the act of mea-
surement occupy a fundamentally distinguished place in
quantum theory can be seen to be excess baggage. These
ideas arose naturally, in part from our position in the
late universe where there are classically behaving objects
and even observers. In part, they arose from the neces-
sary focus on laboratory experiments as the most direct
probe of quantum phenomena where there is a clear dis-
tinction between observer and observed. However, these
features of the world, while true physical facts in these
situations, are not fundamental. Quantum mechanically,
the classical world and observers are but some possible
systems out of many and measurements are but one pos-
sible interaction of such systems out of many. Both are
unlikely to exist at all in the very early universe. They
are, in a more general post-Everett framework, approx-
imate features of the late universe arising from its par-
ticular quantum state. The classical reality to which we
have become so attached by evolution is but an approx-
imation in an entirely quantum mechanical world made
possible by specific initial conditions.
The originators of the Copenhagen interpretation were
correct; something beyond the wave function and the
Schro¨dinger equation is needed to interpret quantum me-
chanics. But, that addition is not an external restriction
of the domain to which the theory applies. It is the initial
conditions of the universe specified within the quantum
theory itself.
5IV. ARROWS OF TIME
Heat flows from hot to cold bodies, never from cold to
hot. This is the essence of the second law of thermody-
namics that entropy always increases. In the nineteenth
century this law was thought to be strict and fundamen-
tal [11]. A direction of time was distinguished by this
law of nature. After the success of the molecular theory
of matter, with its time symmetric laws of dynamics, the
increase in entropy was seen to be approximate — one
possibility out of many others although the overwhelm-
ingly most probable possibility in most situations. A
direction of time was distinguished, not fundamentally,
but rather by our position in time relative to initial con-
ditions of simplicity and our inability to follow molecular
motion in all accuracy. The idea of a fundamental ther-
modynamic arrow of time was excess baggage.
Exchanging the thermodynamic arrow of time for sim-
ple initial conditions might seem to be exchanging one
asymmetry for another. “Why”, one could ask, “was the
universe simple in the past and not in the future?” In
fact, this is not a question. There is no way of specifying
that direction in time which is the past except by calling
it the direction in which the universe is simple. Its not
an arrow of time which is fundamental, but rather the
fact that the universe is simple at one end and not at the
other [27].
The Hamiltonian formulation of quantum mechanics
also possesses a similar distinction between past and fu-
ture. From the knowledge of the state of a system at one
time alone, one can predict the future but one cannot, in
general, retrodict the past [13]. This is an expression of
causality in quantum theory. Indeed, quantum mechan-
ics in general prohibits the construction of history. The
two slit experiment is a famous example (Figure 3). Un-
less there was a measurement, it is not just that one can’t
say for certain which slit the electron went through; it is
meaningless even to assign a probability. In this asymme-
try between past and future the notion of “state” in quan-
tum mechanics is different from that of classical physics
from which both future and past can be extrapolated. In
Hamiltonian quantum mechanics, the past is the direc-
tion which is comprehensible by theory; the future is the
direction which is generally predictable.
As long as the distinction between future and past in
cosmology is fundamental, it is perhaps reasonable to for-
mulate a quantum cosmology using a quantum mechanics
which maintains this same distinction as fundamental.
However, it would seem more natural if causality were
an empirical conclusion about the universe rather than
a prerequisite for formulating a theory of it. That is,
it would seem more natural if causality were but one of
many options available in quantum mechanics, but the
one appropriate for this particular universe. For exam-
ple, one might imagine a universe where both initial and
final conditions are set. The generalization of Hamilto-
nian quantum mechanics necessary to accommodate such
situations is not difficult to find [14]. In fact, it is ready
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FIG. 3: The two slit experiment. An electron gun at left
emits an electron traveling toward a screen with two slits, its
progress in space recapitulating its evolution in time. From a
knowledge of the wave function at the detecting screen alone,
it is not possible to assign a probability to whether the elec-
tron went through the upper slit or the lower slit.
to hand in the sum over histories formulation described
briefly in Section II. The rules are the same, but both
initial and final conditions are imposed on a contribut-
ing history. In the context of such a generalization, the
arrow of time in quantum mechanics, and the associated
notion of state [15] would not be fundamental. Rather
they would be features of the theory arising from the
fact that those conditions which fix our particular uni-
verse are comprehensible at one of its ends but not at the
other.
V. QUANTUM SPACETIME
Gravity governs the structure and evolution of the uni-
verse on the largest scales, both in space and time. To
pose a quantum theory of cosmology, therefore, we need
a quantum theory of gravity. The essence of the classical
theory of gravity – Einstein’s general relativity – is that
gravity is curved spacetime. We thus need a quantum
theory of space and time themselves in which the geom-
etry of spacetime will exhibit quantum fluctuations.
Finding a consistent, manageable quantum theory of
gravity has been one of the goals of theoretical research
for the last thirty years. The chief problem has been seen
as finding a theory which puts out more predictions then
there are input parameters. But, in cosmology there is
also a conflict with the existing framework of quantum
mechanics. These difficulties are called “the problem of
time” [16]
Time plays a special and peculiar role in the familiar
Hamiltonian formulation of quantum mechanics. All ob-
servations are assumed to be unambiguously character-
6ized by a single moment of time and we calculate proba-
bilities for “observations at one moment of time”. Time
is the only observable for which there are no interfering
alternatives (as a measurement of momentum is an inter-
fering alternative for a measurement of position). Time
is the sole observable not represented in the theory as an
operator but rather enters the Schro¨dinger equation as a
parameter describing evolution.
If the geometry of spacetime is fixed, external and clas-
sical, it provides the preferred time of quantum mechan-
ics. (More exactly, a fixed background spacetime pro-
vides a family of timelike directions equivalent in their
quantum mechanics because of relativistic causality.) If
the geometry of spacetime is quantum mechanical – fluc-
tuating and without definite value – then it cannot supply
a notion of time for quantum mechanics. There is thus a
conflict between the familiar Hamiltonian quantum me-
chanics with a preferred time and a quantum theory of
spacetime. This is the “problem of time”.
The usual response to this difficulty has been to keep
Hamiltonian quantum mechanics but to give up on space-
time. There are several candidates for a replacement the-
ory. Perhaps space and time are separate quantum me-
chanically with the beautiful synthesis of Minkowski and
Einstein emerging only in the classical limit [18]. Per-
haps spacetime needs to be augmented by other, now hid-
den, variables which play the role of a preferred time in
quantum mechanics [19]. Perhaps spacetime is simply a
totally inappropriate notion fundamentally and emerges
only in the classical limit of some yet more subtle theory.
Each of these ideas could be right. I would like to sug-
gest, however, that there is another alternative. This is
that the notion of a preferred time in quantum mechanics
is another case of excess baggage. That the Hamiltonian
formulation of quantum mechanics is simply not general
enough to encompass a quantum theory of spacetime.
That the present formulation of quantum mechanics is
but an approximation to a more general framework ap-
propriate because of our special position in the universe.
It is not difficult to identify that property of the late
universe which would have led to the perception that
there is a preferred time in quantum mechanics. Here,
now, on all accessible scales, from the smallest ones of
the most energetic accelerators to the largest ones of the
furthest seeing telescopes, spacetime is classical. The
preferred time of quantum mechanics reflects this true
physical fact. However, it can only be an approximate
fact if spacetime is quantum mechanical. Indeed, like all
other aspects of the classical world, it must be a prop-
erty of the particular quantum initial conditions of the
universe. The present formulation of quantum mechan-
ics thus may be only an approximation to a more gen-
eral framework appropriate because of particular initial
conditions which mandate classical spacetime in the late
universe.
What is this more general quantum mechanics? Feyn-
man’s sum over histories supplies a natural candidate
[20, 21, 22] I shall now sketch why. We saw earlier that
Feynman’s approach was equivalent to the Hamiltonian
one for particle quantum mechanics. It is also for field
theory. A little thought about our example shows, how-
ever, that this equivalence arises from a special property
of the histories – that they do not double back on them-
selves in time. Thus, the preferred time enters the sum
over histories formulation as a restriction on the allowed
histories.
In a quantum theory of spacetime the histories are four
dimensional spacetimes geometries G with matter fields
φ(x) living upon them. The sums over histories defining
quantum amplitudes therefore have the form:
∑
G
∑
φ(x)
exp (i S[G, φ(x)]/h¯) (5.1)
where S is the action for gravity coupled to matter. The
sums are restricted by the theory of initial conditions
and by the observations whose probabilities one aims to
compute.
The interior sum in (5.1)
∑
φ(x)
exp (i S[G, φ(x)]/h¯) (5.2)
defines a usual quantum field theory in a temporarily
fixed background spacetime G. The requirement that the
fields be single valued on spacetime is the analog of the
requirement for particles that the paths do not double
back in time. This quantum field theory thus possesses
an equivalent Hamiltonian quantum mechanics with the
preferred time directions being those of the background
G.
When the remaining sum over G is carried out the
equivalence with any Hamiltonian formulation disap-
pears. There is no longer any fixed geometry, any exter-
nal time, to define the preferred time of a Hamiltonian
formulation. All that is summed over. There would be an
approximate equivalence with a Hamiltonian formulation
were the initial conditions to imply that for large scale
questions in the late universe, only a single geometry Gˆ
(or an incoherent sum of geometries) contributes to the
sum over geometries. For then,
∑
G
∑
φ(x)
exp (i S[G, φ(x)]/h¯) ≈
∑
φ(x)
exp
(
i S[Gˆ, φ(x)]/h¯
)
(5.3)
and the preferred time can be that of the geometry Gˆ.
It would be in this way that the familiar formulation
of quantum mechanics emerges as an approximation to a
more general sum over histories framework appropriate to
specific initial conditions and our special position in the
universe so far from the big bang and the centers of black
holes. The preferred time of familiar quantum mechanics
would then be another example of excess baggage.
In declaring the preferred time of familiar quantum
mechanics excess baggage, one is also giving up as fun-
damental a number of treasured notions with which it is
closely associated. These include the notion of causality,
7any notion of state at a moment of time, and any notion
of unitary evolution of such states. Each of these ideas
requires a background spacetime for its definition and in
a quantum theory of spacetime there is none to be had.
Such ideas, however, would have an approximate validity
in the late universe on those scales where spacetime is
classical. Many will regard discarding these notions as
too radical a step but I think it no less radical than dis-
carding spacetime – one of the most powerful organizing
features of our experience.
VI. FOR THE FUTURE
In this discussion of the excess baggage which has been
discarded to arrive at a quantum mechanical framework
general enough to apply to the universe as a whole, we
have progressed from historical examples, through rea-
sonable generalizations, to topics of current research and
debate. Even in the last case, I was able to indicate to
you candidates for the necessary generalizations. I would
now like to turn to features of the theoretical framework
where this is not the case; where there may be excess
baggage but for which I have no clear candidates for the
generalizations.
A. “Initial” Conditions
A candidate for excess baggage is the idea that there is
anything “initial” about the conditions which are needed
in addition to the laws of dynamics to make predictions in
the universe. Our idea that conditions are initial comes
from big bang cosmology in which the universe has a his-
tory with a simple beginning ten and some billion years
ago. The global picture of spacetime is that there is a
more or less uniform expansion everywhere from this mo-
ment. Perhaps the very large scale structure of spacetime
is very different. Perhaps, as A. Linde has suggested [23]
there are many beginnings. Our local expanding universe
might be just one inflationary bubble out of many oth-
ers. Perhaps, therefore, the idea that conditions should
reflect a simple state at one end of the universe is excess
baggage arising from our confinement to one of these bub-
bles. Conditions in addition to dynamics would still be
needed for prediction but they might be of a very differ-
ent character [24].
B. Conditions and Dynamics
In the framework we have discussed so far there are
three kinds of information necessary for prediction in
quantum cosmology: First, there are the laws of dynam-
ics summarized by the action. Second, there is the spec-
ification of initial (or other) conditions. Third, there are
our specific observations. Is it fundamental that the pro-
cess of prediction be structured in this way?
Our focus on laboratory science, I believe, is the ori-
gin of the idea that there is a clean separation between
dynamics and conditions. Dynamics are governed by the
laws of nature; that which we are seeking, not that which
we control. By contrast, the conditions represented in the
experimental arrangement are up to us and therefore not
part of the laws of nature. This ideal of control is not
truly realized in practice in the laboratory, but in cos-
mology it is never realized. The initial conditions of the
universe are most definitely not up to us but must be
specified in the theoretical framework in the same law-
like way as the dynamics. A law of initial conditions
has, therefore, become one of the central objectives of
quantum cosmology [26]. However, is it not possible that
the distinction between conditions and dynamics is ex-
cess baggage arising from the focus on laboratory science
to which our limited resources have restricted us? Is it
not possible that there are some more general principles
in a more general framework which determine both the
conditions and dynamics? Is it not possible, as it were,
that there is a principle which fixes both the state and
the Hamiltonian?
Recent work by Hawking [27], Coleman [28], Giddings
and Strominger [29] among others gives some encourage-
ment to this point of view. They show that in a quantum
theory of spacetime which includes wormholes — small
handles on spacetime connecting perhaps widely sepa-
rated spacetime regions – that there is a closer connec-
tion between initial conditions and dynamics than had
been previously thought. Specifically, the initial condi-
tions determine the form of the Hamiltonian that we see
at energies below those on which spacetime has quan-
tum fluctuations. Indeed, they may determine a range
of possibilities for the Hamiltonian only one of which is
realized in our large scale universe. Dynamics and initial
conditions are thereby entwined at a fundamental level.
C. The Laws of Physics
The last candidate for excess baggage that I want to
discuss is the idea that the laws of physics, and in par-
ticular laws of initial conditions, are unique, apart from
the universe, apart from the process of their construc-
tion, and apart from us [30, 31] Scientists, like mathe-
maticians, proceed as though the truths of their subjects
had an independent existence. We speak, for example, of
“discovering” the laws of nature as though there were a
single set of rules by which the universe is run with an
actuality apart from this world they govern.
Most honestly, the laws of physics are properties of the
collective data that we have about the universe. In the
language of complexity theory, this data is compressible.
There are computational algorithms by which the data
can be stored in a shorter message. Take, for example, an
observed history of motion of a system of classical parti-
cles. This history could be described to a given accuracy
by giving the position and momentum of each particle
8at a suitably refined series of times. However, this mes-
sage can be compressed to a statement of the positions
and momenta at one time plus the equations of motion.
Some of these initial values might be specified by obser-
vation but most, for a large system, will be specified by
theory and statistically at that. For large systems the
result is a much shorter message. Further, we find for
many different systems that the data can be compressed
to the form of initial conditions plus the same equations
of motion. It is the universal character of this extra in-
formation beyond the initial conditions which gives the
equations of motion their law-like character. Similarly in
quantum mechanics. Thus we have:
All
Observations
→


Some Observations
+
Laws of Dynamics
+
Laws of Initial Conditions
(6.1)
The laws of physics, therefore, do not exist independently
of the data. They are properties of our data much like
“random” or “computable” is a property of a number
although probably (as we shall see below) in a less precise
sense [32].
This characterization of compression is incomplete.
Any non-physicist knows that one can’t just take a list of
numbers and compress them in this way. One has to take
a few courses in physics and mathematics to know what
the symbols mean and how to compute with them. That
is, to the list on the right should be appended the al-
gorithms for numerical computation for practical imple-
mentation of the theory, that part of mathematics which
needed to interpret the results, the rules of the language,
etc. etc. Yet more properly we should write:
All
Observations
→


Some Observations
+
Laws of Dynamics
+
Laws of Initial Conditions
+
Algorithms for Calculation
+
Mathematics
+
Language
+
Culture
+
Specific Evolutionary History
+ · · ·
(6.2)
What confidence do we have that our data can always
be compressed in this way? I have discussed the possi-
bility that a clear division between initial conditions and
equations of motion may be excess baggage. Bob Geroch
and I have discussed similar questions for the division
between algorithms and the rest of physical theory [33].
However it is subdivided, what guarantee do we have
that the resulting theory will be unique, independent of
its process of construction, independent of the specific
data we have acquired? Very little it seems. As we move
down the list on the right we encounter more and more
items which seem particular to our specific history as a
collectivity of observers and to our specific data. It is
an elementary observation that there are always many
theories which will fit a given set of data just as there
are many curves which will interpolate between a finite
set of points. Further, when the data is probabilistic as
it is in quantum theory, there is always the possibility of
arriving at different theories whatever criteria are used
to distinguish them.
Beyond this, however, what confidence do we have
that different groups of observers, with different histo-
ries, with growing but different sets of specific data, will,
in the fullness of time, arrive at the same fundamental
theory? I do not mean to suggest that the theories might
vary because they are consequences of specific history, for
that is not science. Rather the question is whether there
observationally indistinguishable theories which are dif-
ferent because of the processes of their discovery.
There may be specifically cosmological reasons to ex-
pect non-uniqueness in theories of initial conditions. A
theory of initial conditions, for example, must be sim-
ple enough that it can be stored within the universe. If
the initial conditions amounted to some particular com-
plex specification of the state of all matter this would
not be possible. The act of constructing theories may
limit our ability to find them. The gravitational effect
of moving a gram of matter on Sirius by one centimeter
in an unknown direction is enough to ruin our ability to
extrapolate classically the motions of a mole of gas par-
ticles beyond a few seconds into the past [34]. In view of
this there must be many theories of initial conditions ren-
dered indistinguishable simply by our act of constructing
them.
It would be interesting, I think, to have a framework
which dispensed with the excess baggage that the laws of
physics were separate from our observations of the uni-
verse, a framework in which the inductive process of con-
structing laws about the universe was described in it,
and in which our theories were seen as but one possibil-
ity among many.
VII. CONCLUSION
The assignment of the organizers was not just to speak
on the subject “Where are our efforts leading?”. They
also wanted to know “In fifty or one hundred years time
how do you think today’s efforts will appear?”. I have
been bold enough to try their first question, I shall not
be foolish enough to essay the second. I shall, however,
offer a hope, and that is this: That in the future this
might be seen a the time when scientists began to take
seriously the idea that it was important to consider the
9universe as a whole and science as a unity, the time when
they began to take seriously the search for a law of how
the universe started, began to work out its implications
for science generally, and began to discard the remainder
of our excess baggage.
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